Budget context
Armenia's defence budget has nearly doubled since 2020 as emergency supplementals funded post-war rearmament. The 2025 appropriation is approximately AMD 550 billion ($1 billion USD), representing an extraordinary ~5% of GDP for a small economy. Emergency procurement in 2023-24 was driven by the September 2023 lightning Azerbaijani offensive that retook Nagorno-Karabakh in 24 hours — humiliating Armenian-backed Karabakh Defense Forces and triggering the exodus of 100,000 ethnic Armenians. France's CAESAR 155mm self-propelled howitzers, India's Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, and various Indian artillery shells and small arms have been the primary new acquisitions. Russia's role as supplier has sharply contracted following CSTO's failure to respond in 2023.
Force structure
The Armenian Armed Forces field approximately 44,800 active personnel organized around the Army (the dominant service), Air Force, and Air Defence Force. The Army operates T-72 and T-72B tanks, BMP-2 IFVs, and inherited Soviet artillery — supplemented now by French Caesar SPHs and Indian Pinaka MLRS. The Air Force has limited combat capability; Su-30SM fighters acquired from Russia remain the primary fast jet. Armenia lost significant materiel in 2020-2023, including Smerch MLRS, Iskander-M tactical ballistic missiles, and substantial stocks of armour. Reconstruction of force structure is a multi-year priority. Conscription provides the personnel base with 24-month service.
Industrial posture
Armenia has a limited but historically significant defence-technical sector. Soviet-era facilities in Yerevan produced electronics and guidance components; some have been revived. Armenia has no domestic capacity for tanks, aircraft, or advanced missiles. The pivot away from Russia has exposed Armenia's dependency: most existing heavy equipment is Russian-origin, requiring Russian spare parts that are now politically difficult to obtain. India has emerged as a key strategic supplier — less politically complex than Western governments and willing to provide lethal systems without the conditionality of EU arms export controls. France's Caesar deal included technology transfer discussions for maintenance infrastructure.
Conflict exposure
Armenia's security environment is defined by its ongoing standoff with Azerbaijan. Despite a November 2020 ceasefire (brokered by Russia), Azerbaijan launched further military actions in May 2021 (Syunik incursion), March 2022, and September 2022 before the decisive September 2023 offensive that ended Karabakh's Armenian governance. Armenia and Azerbaijan are negotiating a formal peace treaty but key issues — border demarcation, Lachin corridor, constitutional references to Karabakh — remain unresolved as of 2025. Tensions on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border in Tavush Province (April 2024) produced further clashes. Iran has signalled concern about Azerbaijani ambitions toward the Zangezur corridor (which would connect Azerbaijan and Turkey through Armenian territory).
Recent developments
France delivered the first Caesar 155mm SPH battery to Armenia in early 2024, marking the most significant Western arms transfer to Yerevan in its post-Soviet history. India's Pinaka MLRS batteries were delivered in 2023-24. Armenia formally suspended its participation in CSTO exercises in 2024 and Prime Minister Pashinyan stated Armenia would not recognize Russia as a security guarantor. Armenia applied to join the EU's Eastern Partnership enhanced tracks and polling showed majority support for EU membership. Peace treaty talks with Azerbaijan continued under EU and US mediation through 2025, with partial agreement on border demarcation reached in segments.