Budget context
Georgia's defence budget has grown modestly since the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, which demonstrated the asymmetric threat from Russia. The 2025 budget of approximately 1.7 billion GEL ($400 million USD) reflects Georgia's limited economic base. US Foreign Military Financing (FMF) has been a critical supplement — providing military equipment, training, and infrastructure — but was partially suspended in 2024 amid concerns over the Georgian Dream government's democratic backsliding and the "foreign influence" law modelled on Russian legislation. NATO's Enhanced Opportunities Partnership gives Georgia privileged access to exercises and information sharing but falls short of a formal Membership Action Plan.
Force structure
The Georgian Armed Forces field approximately 20,650 active personnel across the Ground Forces, Air Force, National Guard, and Coast Guard. The Ground Forces operate a mix of US-supplied Humvees and M4 rifles alongside Soviet-era T-72 tanks and BMP infantry fighting vehicles. Artillery includes US M198 155mm howitzers. The Air Force operates transport and helicopter assets; Georgia lacks fast jet combat aircraft following the destruction of its Su-25s in 2008. The National Guard provides a reserve-force foundation. Georgia maintains an extensive training partnership with the US through the Georgian Defense Readiness Program (GDRP). South Ossetia and Abkhazia remain garrisoned by Russian forces with Iskander ballistic missiles deployed.
Industrial posture
Georgia has minimal domestic defence industry. Small-arms production at the Defence Industry of Georgia (DIG) manufactures Kalashnikov-type rifles and carbines for the armed forces and limited export. Georgia has no capability to produce aircraft, armoured vehicles, or advanced missiles. Western orientation of procurement has made Georgia US- and European-market dependent. Israeli firms have provided surveillance systems and UAVs. The 2008 war exposed Georgia's dependence on imports when Russian strikes targeted Senaki air base and damaged infrastructure. Attempts to attract defence FDI have been limited by market size and political uncertainty since 2024.
Conflict exposure
Russia occupies South Ossetia and Abkhazia — roughly 20% of internationally recognized Georgian territory — and has stationed 4,000-7,000 troops in both regions. Russian forces conduct periodic "borderization" operations — erecting barriers and moving boundary markers deeper into Georgian-controlled territory. The 2008 precedent and Russia's 2022 Ukraine invasion have heightened awareness of the risk of renewed Russian military action, particularly if Georgia's NATO aspirations advanced. Paradoxically, the Georgian Dream government's pro-Russia pivot since 2024 may have reduced immediate invasion risk while deepening long-term strategic vulnerability. Mass protests erupted in Tbilisi from November 2024 through 2025 opposing the foreign agent law and EU accession freeze.
Recent developments
In October 2024 the Georgian Dream party claimed a disputed parliamentary election victory, and Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced the suspension of EU accession talks until 2028 — triggering the largest protests since independence. The EU suspended some cooperation programs and the US announced partial suspension of FMF and State Partnership Program activities in response to democratic backsliding. President Salome Zourabichvili (opposition-aligned) refused to recognize the election results and was removed from office in January 2025. Georgia's NATO membership prospects are considered effectively frozen under the current government. Russian "borderization" incidents continued in South Ossetia through 2025.