Rank #91 · Americas
Bolivia maintains a modest defence budget of roughly $530 million (approximately 1.4% of GDP), reflecting the country's landlocked geography and absence of conventional external threats. The armed forces are primarily oriented toward internal security, anti-narcotics operations in coca-growing regions, and civic-action programs that substitute for limited state capacity in remote areas.
Bolivia's defence appropriation is set in the Presupuesto General del Estado and has grown slowly alongside hydrocarbon revenues, which historically funded social spending rather than military modernisation. The 2025 budget allocated roughly 3.2 billion Bolivianos to defence, with supplementary decrees adding police-support and border-control line items. Fiscal pressure from declining natural gas export revenues since 2019 has constrained procurement; no major capital-equipment programme is underway. Pay and allowances consume the dominant share of the budget, with readiness and logistics chronically underfunded.
The Fuerzas Armadas de Bolivia comprise the Army (Ejército), Navy (Armada Boliviana — a riverine and lake force despite landlocked status), and Air Force (Fuerza Aérea). Total active duty is approximately 37,000. The Army holds six military regions, with concentrations along the Chapare coca zone and Brazilian border. The Armada operates patrol craft on Lake Titicaca and navigable rivers. The Air Force fields a small transport and light-attack inventory (K-8W trainers, ageing SIAI-Marchetti). A special anti-narcotics task force (FELCN) operates alongside military units in the Chapare.
Bolivia has no significant domestic defence industry beyond COFADENA, the state corporation that produces small-arms ammunition and operates maintenance depots. All major platforms are imported. China has emerged as the primary supplier of recent acquisitions including radar systems and light vehicles. Russia supplied Mi-17 helicopters, though serviceability is affected by spare-parts constraints post-2022 sanctions pressure. Brazil supplies patrol craft and light equipment under bilateral agreements. Bolivia has historically sought to avoid arms-import dependency on any single power, but budget constraints limit purchasing options.
Bolivia faces no interstate military threats. The principal security challenge is narco-trafficking through the Chapare and Yungas coca regions, where military units support the FELCN. A failed coup attempt in June 2024 — when armoured vehicles rammed the Government Palace in La Paz before being repelled — highlighted institutional civil-military tensions under President Luis Arce. The political crisis between Arce and former president Evo Morales, who backed different military factions, created brief uncertainty about command loyalties. The coup attempt resulted in several arrests including the commanding general.
The June 26, 2024 coup attempt by General Juan José Zúñiga, who deployed IFVs against the Government Palace, was suppressed within hours and resulted in Zúñiga's arrest. The incident exposed factional tensions within the military aligned with rival political camps. President Arce subsequently reshuffled senior military leadership. Bolivia's 2025 defence budget was marginally increased amid fiscal austerity driven by declining gas revenues. The government has pursued talks with China on radar and surveillance equipment to support border monitoring, reflecting continued preference for Chinese suppliers.
Bolivia lost its Pacific coast to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) and has maintained a navy ever since as an assertion of the aspiration to recover sea access. The Armada Boliviana operates on Lake Titicaca and river systems, performing patrol, customs, and fisheries-protection roles.
On June 26, 2024, General Juan José Zúñiga ordered armoured vehicles to ram the doors of the Government Palace in La Paz. The attempt collapsed within hours; Zúñiga was arrested and faces charges of sedition and terrorism. Several senior officers were detained alongside him.
China is the leading current supplier of radar and surveillance equipment; Russia supplied Mi-17 helicopters (spare parts now constrained); Brazil provides patrol craft and light vehicles. Bolivia avoids formal alliances but leans toward non-Western suppliers.
Anti-narcotics operations in the Chapare and Yungas coca zones are the primary operational commitment, alongside border patrol and civic-action programs in remote regions. The military also provides disaster relief and civic works in areas with low state presence.