Budget context
Mozambique's defence budget is among the smallest in absolute terms in southern Africa. The formal allocation has grown nominally since 2017 as the Cabo Delgado insurgency intensified, but funding remains inadequate for the operational demands. The FDM is supplemented by the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) — a regional peacekeeping mission that has deployed Tanzanian, South African, Botswanan, and other SADC troops — and Rwanda's bilateral mission, the most operationally effective external force. Rwanda negotiated access to offshore gas concession revenues and agriculture development rights in exchange for the military deployment. TotalEnergies' suspended LNG project, worth $14.9 billion in investment, would have transformed Mozambique's fiscal base.
Force structure
The FDM fields approximately 12,000 active personnel across army, navy (Indian Ocean patrol), and air force (transport helicopters, a few light aircraft). The army is the dominant service, organised into territorial brigades. Equipment is ageing Soviet-era (T-54/55 tanks, BTR-60/80 APCs) mixed with more recent Chinese and Portuguese-supplied vehicles. The Cabo Delgado operational area is served by a dedicated joint task force that integrates FDM, Rwandan forces, and SAMIM contingents. Command-and-control between these forces is only partially integrated. The FDM has a poor human rights record in Cabo Delgado, with documented abuses against civilians.
Industrial posture
Mozambique has no domestic defence industry. All weapons and major equipment are imported — historically from the Soviet Union/Russia (which supplied much of the legacy inventory), and more recently from China and Portugal. Rwanda has provided vehicles and small arms as part of the bilateral deployment arrangement. The private military company Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) operated helicopter gunships in Cabo Delgado 2020-2021 on a South African-contracted basis until being replaced by Rwandan forces. Mozambique's extreme poverty (it ranks among the world's poorest countries by per capita income) means procurement ambitions are severely constrained.
Conflict exposure
The Ansar al-Sunna Wa-Jama (locally called "Al-Shabaab" — no relation to the Somali group) began operations in Cabo Delgado in 2017 and has attacked villages, executed civilians, and occupied towns including Mocímboa da Praia (briefly held 2020-2021). The group has links to ISIS-Mozambique. Rwandan forces retook Mocímboa da Praia in August 2021; since then, Rwandan-FDM operations have cleared the coastal corridor. However, the insurgency has not been defeated and continues to operate in forest areas. Over 1.3 million people remain displaced. TotalEnergies declared force majeure on its Afungi LNG site in April 2021 and the site remains suspended as of 2025-2026.
Recent developments
President Daniel Chapo took office in January 2025 following the contested October 2024 election — disputed results triggered post-election violence that killed over 300 people and paralysed parts of the country for months. The political crisis complicated Cabo Delgado operations. Rwanda renewed its bilateral military cooperation agreement in 2025, maintaining approximately 2,500 troops. SAMIM mission mandate was renewed under SADC, though South Africa reduced its contingent citing budget constraints. TotalEnergies has not announced a restart date for the Afungi LNG project. Zimbabwe contributes forces to SAMIM under its regional peacekeeping commitments.