Rank #2 · Asia-Pacific
China is the world's second-largest military spender, with SIPRI estimating $336 billion in 2025 (1.7% of GDP) — a 7.4% real-terms increase and the 30th consecutive year of growth. Beijing’s official 2025 budget of 1.785 trillion yuan funds a sweeping PLA modernization program oriented toward a Taiwan contingency, a 600-warhead nuclear stockpile expanding at roughly 100 weapons per year, and the world’s largest navy by hull count.
China’s 2025 official defence budget was 1.7847 trillion yuan (~$249B), a 7.2% nominal increase reported to the National People’s Congress in March 2025. SIPRI’s $336B figure adds paramilitary forces, military R&D, arms imports, and military pensions that Beijing accounts for outside the headline budget. Procurement is dominated by naval shipbuilding (Type 055 cruisers, Type 003 Fujian carrier sea trials completed in 2024), the J-20 fighter line, and the PLA Rocket Force’s DF-26, DF-27, and DF-41 systems. Personnel costs remain ~30% of the headline budget despite the 2015 reforms that cut 300,000 troops. Spending is forecast to rise at single-digit rates indefinitely while GDP growth slows.
The PLA fields ~2.04 million active personnel across five services: Army (PLA-A), Navy (PLAN), Air Force (PLAAF), Rocket Force (PLARF), and the Aerospace Force/Cyberspace Force/Information Support Force trio that replaced the dissolved Strategic Support Force in April 2024. The PLAN now operates ~370 ships including three carriers (Liaoning, Shandong, Fujian) and is the world’s largest navy by hull count. The PLA Rocket Force operates ~3,000 ballistic and cruise missiles. Five Theater Commands replaced the seven legacy Military Regions in 2016. The People’s Armed Police (~625,000) handles internal security and the Coast Guard. The PAP and PLA both report to the Central Military Commission chaired by Xi Jinping.
China’s defence industry is consolidated under a handful of state-owned giants: NORINCO (land systems), AVIC (aviation), CSSC (shipbuilding), CASC and CASIC (missiles/space), and CETC (electronics). Domestic production now covers nearly the full spectrum, including 5th-gen fighters (J-20, J-35), AESA radars, and hypersonic glide vehicles (DF-ZF). Remaining import dependencies — large turbofan engines and some submarine technology — are narrowing as the WS-15 enters serial production. China is the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter (SIPRI 2020-2024 average), with Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Algeria as primary customers. Civil-military fusion policy channels commercial AI, semiconductor, and shipbuilding capacity into defence priorities.
China is not engaged in active combat but maintains the highest-tempo grey-zone posture of any major power. PLA Joint Sword exercises around Taiwan have grown in scale and frequency through 2025-2026, with regular ADIZ incursions averaging 10+ daily sorties. Coast Guard and Maritime Militia confrontations with the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal continue. The disputed Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control remains tense after the 2020 Galwan clash, though October 2024 disengagement at Demchok and Depsang reduced friction. China provides dual-use components to Russia’s wartime industry, drawing US and EU secondary sanctions pressure throughout 2025-2026.
The April 27, 2026 SIPRI release placed China’s 2025 spend at $336B, up 7.4% in real terms. The Fujian carrier began operational deployments in early 2026 after completing eight sea trials. SIPRI Yearbook 2025 confirmed the warhead stockpile crossed 600. In December 2025 the Pentagon’s China Military Power Report assessed PLA discipline purges (including former Defense Minister Li Shangfu in 2023 and Rocket Force commanders in 2024) had not slowed modernization pace. The April 2024 service reorganization replaced the Strategic Support Force with three independent arms directly under the CMC, formalizing space and cyber as separate warfighting domains.
SIPRI estimates China spent $336 billion on its military in 2025, a 7.4% real-terms increase over 2024. China’s official 2025 budget reported to the National People’s Congress was 1.7847 trillion yuan (~$249B); SIPRI adds paramilitary, R&D, and military pensions kept off the headline figure to reach $336B.
About 1.7% of GDP per SIPRI’s 2025 estimate. The official PRC figure is closer to 1.3%. Beijing has held this share roughly constant for two decades, letting absolute spending rise with GDP rather than declaring a higher percentage.
Approximately 600 warheads as of 2025, per SIPRI and FAS. The arsenal has grown by roughly 100 warheads per year since 2023 and is projected to exceed 1,000 by 2030. The Pentagon assesses China is on track for 1,500 warheads by 2035, drawing roughly to parity with deployed US and Russian forces.
The PLA fields ~2.04 million active personnel across Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and the Aerospace/Cyberspace/Information Support Forces. With ~625,000 People’s Armed Police and Coast Guard personnel, China’s total uniformed strength is the largest in the world.
AVIC (aviation), NORINCO (land systems), CSSC (shipbuilding), CASC and CASIC (missiles and space), and CETC (electronics). All are state-owned and rank in the global top 25 by revenue. Civil-military fusion policy channels commercial firms — Huawei, BYD, SMIC — into defence supply chains.