Rank #41 · Asia-Pacific
Vietnam operates one of Southeast Asia's largest militaries (450,000 active duty) with estimated defense spending near $7.7B (2.2% of GDP) in 2025, though official figures are not routinely disclosed. Hanoi's "Four Nos" defense policy — no military alliances, no foreign bases on Vietnamese soil, no alignment with one country against another, no use of force except in self-defense — frames a carefully diversified procurement strategy that pairs Russia's Su-30MK2 fleet and T-90 tanks with Israeli UAVs, Indian BrahMos missiles, and South Korean howitzers.
Vietnam does not publish detailed defense budget breakdowns. Spending estimates derived from SIPRI and GlobalData place the 2025 total between $7B and $11B depending on methodology and exchange-rate assumptions; the Vietnamese government has allocated increasing shares of state expenditure to defense since 2015. Resolution 70/2022 planned USD 6.65B in recurrent defense expenditure for 2023; the 2025 figure is estimated higher given 8%+ GDP growth and documented procurement programs. A $700M BrahMos cruise missile deal finalized in April 2025 with India, co-production agreements with South Korean and Czech aerospace firms, and continued Russian platform delivery are the largest recent outlays.
The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) comprises 450,000 active-duty personnel: Ground Force (~400,000), Navy (~40,000), Air Defence–Air Force (~30,000), Border Defence Force, and Coast Guard. The Ground Force is the dominant branch. The Air Force operates Su-30MK2 multirole fighters and Su-27SK air-superiority jets alongside CASA C-295 transports. The Navy fields six Kilo-class submarines based at Cam Ranh Bay, Gepard-class frigates, and a fleet of missile corvettes; the Kilo boats are Vietnam's most capable ASW and strike asset. The T-90S/SK tank fleet (64 units delivered 2018-2019) supplements legacy T-54/55s and Chinese Type-59s.
Vietnam's defense industry is developing but nascent. The General Department of Defence Industry (GDDI) oversees licensed production of ammunition, small arms, and armored vehicles. In 2023, Vietnam passed an amended Arms and Ammunition Law intended to open the market to foreign firms for co-production, signaling intent to grow the industrial base. Co-production agreements with Czech aerospace companies (small unmanned systems) and component agreements with Hanwha (K9 howitzer parts) are early examples. Vietnam remains overwhelmingly import-dependent for major systems. Russian arms sanctions exposure post-2022 has accelerated diversification toward Israel, India, South Korea, and Western Europe.
Vietnam's primary security concern is Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea (which Vietnam calls the East Sea). Vietnam claims sovereignty over both the Paracel Islands (occupied by China since 1974) and the Spratly Islands (partially occupied). Maritime incidents with Chinese coast guard and fishing militia vessels in Vietnam's EEZ are frequent; 2024-2025 saw escalated Chinese pressure on the Vanguard Bank area. Vietnam's military posture is oriented toward anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) in the maritime domain: coastal anti-ship missiles, Kilo-submarine torpedo and Klub-S strike capability, and the BrahMos supersonic missile (contracted April 2025) provide layered deterrence. No active armed conflict as of 2026.
In April 2025, Vietnam finalized a $700M deal with India for BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, representing the largest-ever Indian defense export and a significant diversification from Russian dominance. In 2024-2025, Vietnam commissioned additional Gepard-class frigates and invested in Cam Ranh Bay basing infrastructure for the Kilo submarine fleet. Vietnam banks on a new domestically developed coastal cruise missile (revealed at Defence Vietnam 2024 expo) for layered littoral denial. SIPRI's April 2026 release placed Vietnam within the top 40 global spenders, reflecting continued budget growth averaging 5-8% annually. A planned acquisition of Su-57 fighters from Russia remains unconfirmed.
Vietnam's defense doctrine formally prohibits: (1) military alliances with any country; (2) foreign military bases on Vietnamese soil; (3) aligning with one country to oppose another; and (4) using or threatening force in international relations (except self-defense). This "strategic ambiguity" posture allows Vietnam to buy weapons from Russia, Israel, India, and South Korea simultaneously while maintaining relations with China.
Six Kilo-class (Project 636) diesel-electric submarines, acquired from Russia between 2013 and 2017 for approximately $2B. The Kilo boats are armed with Klub-S cruise missiles (200+ km range), capable of striking surface and land targets. They are based at Cam Ranh Bay, which was upgraded specifically for submarine operations.
Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions complicated Russian arms deliveries and spare-parts supply chains. Vietnam's Russian-origin equipment (Su-30, T-90, Kilo submarines) became harder to maintain. In response, Hanoi accelerated deals with Israel (UAVs, radar), India (BrahMos missiles, finalized April 2025), South Korea (K9 howitzers), and Czech Republic (aerospace components). The diversification reduces dependence on any single supplier.
Yes. Vietnam claims sovereignty over the Paracel Islands (seized by China in 1974) and the Spratly Islands (China partially occupies). Vietnam's EEZ in the South China Sea overlaps significantly with China's nine-dash-line claim. Maritime incidents involving Chinese coast guard and fishing militia vessels have been frequent since 2019, including ram-and-sink incidents at the Vanguard Bank area in 2024-2025. Vietnam's entire military-modernization trajectory is shaped by this maritime challenge.