Budget context
The 2025 defence appropriation was boosted substantially following Decreto Ejecutivo No. 111 of January 9, 2024, which declared a 60-day state of internal armed conflict — later renewed — empowering the military to take control of prisons, ports, and high-crime urban corridors. Emergency security supplementals were financed partly through an IMF-backed fiscal package. Personnel costs dominate at over 60% of the budget; procurement has focused on light vehicles, patrol vessels, surveillance drones, and non-lethal prison-control equipment. US security cooperation under the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) programme has supplemented domestic spending.
Force structure
The Fuerzas Armadas del Ecuador comprise the Army (Ejército, ~23,000), Navy (Armada, ~8,000, including naval infantry), and Air Force (Fuerza Aérea, ~9,600). The joint force is supplemented by a national police of ~47,000. Since January 2024 the military has been deployed across 22 declared conflict zones including Guayaquil, Esmeraldas, and Durán. Special operations units conduct nighttime raids on gang infrastructure. The Air Force operates Super Tucano light-attack aircraft and Israeli-supplied Hermes 450 UAVs for surveillance. Naval patrol vessels operate in the Esmeraldas and Guayas river estuaries used for drug shipment.
Industrial posture
Ecuador has a limited defence industrial base. ASTINAVE in Guayaquil builds and overhauls patrol craft and has delivered river gunboats used in anti-drug operations. All combat aircraft, major weapons, and surveillance systems are imported. The US remains the primary security partner, supplying equipment and training under INCLE and Foreign Military Financing. Israel supplied surveillance drones. Chile and Colombia share intelligence under Andean Community frameworks. Ecuador's small economy and fiscal constraints mean it is unlikely to develop meaningful domestic production capacity; procurement will remain import-dependent.
Conflict exposure
Ecuador faces an acute internal security crisis driven by transnational criminal organisations that have filled power vacuums as Colombian cartels restructured after FARC peace agreements. Los Choneros, Los Lobos, La Fatales, and Tiguerones operate port-to-port cocaine trafficking corridors. The January 2024 crisis peaked when gunmen stormed a live TV broadcast in Guayaquil. Presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio was assassinated in August 2023. The government has designated multiple gangs as terrorist organisations, authorising lethal force. No interstate military threats exist; relations with Colombia and Peru are cooperative on border security.
Recent developments
President Noboa won re-election in April 2025 on a security platform, extending the armed-conflict mandate. By mid-2025, the government claimed homicide rates had dropped approximately 30% from 2023 peaks, though critics contest the figures. The US expanded INCLE funding to Ecuador in the FY2025 supplemental, providing additional interdiction assets. Ecuador agreed in principle to a US naval access arrangement at Manta in late 2024 — reversing the Correa-era decision to close the Forward Operating Location — though the agreement remained under negotiation through 2025-2026.