Rank #82 · Americas
Cuba's Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) operate on an officially declared budget of roughly $110 million — one of the smallest in the Americas — masking a parallel security architecture through the Ministry of the Interior (MININT). The force relies almost entirely on aging Soviet-era equipment and has been hollowed out by mass emigration of military-age Cubans, with over 500,000 departing annually between 2022 and 2024.
Cuba publishes nominal defence budget figures that are widely regarded as incomplete. The official line item for the FAR and MININT combined has hovered near $500–800 million CUP, which at official exchange rates converts to roughly $100–120 million USD. True expenditure is partially hidden in enterprise subsidies — the military operates dozens of state companies (Gaviota tourism, Grupo Empresarial de la Defensa). US and EU sanctions constrain hard-currency procurement. Economic collapse since 2020 — driven by COVID-19, tightening US sanctions, and fuel shortages — has squeezed even the nominal budget. Fuel rationing has curtailed training flights and mechanized exercises since 2022.
The FAR fields approximately 49,000 active personnel across the Army (38,000), Navy (3,000), and Revolutionary Air and Air Defence Force (8,000). Territorial Troop Militia (MTT) provide a large reserve cadre. The Navy operates a coastal patrol role with aging frigates and patrol craft unable to project beyond Cuban waters. The Air Force's MiG-21 and MiG-29 fleets are largely non-operational due to fuel, spare parts, and maintenance shortfalls. MININT's parallel structure — including the Special Brigade — handles internal security and regime protection. Mass emigration since 2022 has created acute manpower challenges for reserve mobilization.
Cuba has virtually no domestic defence industry capable of producing major weapons systems. Soviet-era technical assistance established limited maintenance and repair capability, but without Russian spare parts supply (itself constrained since 2022 by the Ukraine war), the operational readiness of Cuban equipment has fallen sharply. Cuba exports no weapons and imports essentially nothing new due to hard-currency scarcity and US secondary sanctions pressure on suppliers. The military's economic role — running hotels, farms, and import-export firms — is more significant than its warfighting modernization. China has provided limited dual-use technology but no major weapons platforms.
Cuba faces no conventional military threat from a neighbouring state. The principal security concern is internal: regime survival against growing popular discontent following the July 2021 protests (the largest in decades), fuel-driven blackouts through 2024-25, and accelerating emigration. The US embargo and Helms-Burton sanctions constrain both the economy and military procurement. Cuba allegedly dispatched troops or advisers to assist Russia in Ukraine in 2024-25 — an allegation Cuba denies but which several Western governments have cited as ground for additional sanctions. Domestic repression via MININT remains the regime's primary security tool.
Nationwide blackouts in October 2024 triggered protests in multiple provinces; security forces deployed to suppress demonstrations. Estimates from Cuban exile monitoring groups suggest over 500,000 Cubans emigrated in 2022 alone — depressing the draft-eligible population. In early 2025 the US Treasury added new MININT officials to the sanctions list over human rights abuses. Reports from Ukrainian intelligence and several NATO member governments in 2024-25 alleged the presence of Cuban military personnel fighting alongside Russian forces in Ukraine; Cuba denied the claims. The FAR's Air Force MiG-29 squadron has remained grounded for extended periods due to fuel shortages.
Cuba's official defence figures are opaque, but SIPRI estimates total military expenditure at roughly $110 million in 2025 — among the lowest in the Americas. True spending is higher when military-run state enterprises and MININT parallel budgets are included.
Cuba's FAR is substantially less capable than it was during the Cold War. Its Soviet-era aircraft, armour, and naval vessels are largely non-operational due to fuel shortages, spare parts embargoes, and maintenance failures. The force's primary role has shifted to internal regime security rather than conventional deterrence.
Several NATO governments and Ukrainian intelligence alleged in 2024-25 that Cuban nationals — possibly active-duty or recently discharged military — were fighting with Russian forces in Ukraine, reportedly recruited under financial inducements. Cuba officially denied any state involvement.