Rank #93 · Americas
Honduras maintains a defence budget of roughly $700 million, oriented almost entirely toward internal security — principally combating the MS-13 (Mara Salvatrucha) and Barrio 18 street gangs and Honduran drug-trafficking organisations with cartel ties. President Xiomara Castro declared a state of emergency in December 2022 that has been repeatedly extended, integrating military forces into urban police roles and generating significant human rights scrutiny.
Honduras's defence and security budgets are closely intertwined; the Secretaría de Defensa Nacional and Secretaría de Seguridad share operational deployments and some budgetary lines. The 2025 security allocation grew modestly to around $700 million combined, representing roughly 1.6% of GDP. The majority funds personnel — salaries, benefits, and retirement for a force with historically poor equipment readiness. US assistance through CARSI (Central America Regional Security Initiative) and Foreign Military Financing has supplemented domestic spending, though US aid was paused at times over extradition and anti-corruption concerns during the Castro administration.
The Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras (FFAA) comprise the Army (Ejército), Navy (Fuerza Naval), and Air Force (Fuerza Aérea). Total active strength is approximately 15,600. Since December 2022 the FFAA have operated alongside the national police in joint security task forces (FUSEP replacements) under states of emergency in Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, and other high-crime departments. Specialised military police units (PMOP) conduct raids on gang-controlled neighbourhoods. The Air Force operates ageing A-37 Dragonflies and Super Tucanos. The navy patrols Caribbean and Pacific coasts for drug interdiction with US Coast Guard cooperation.
Honduras has no domestic defence industry. All equipment — aircraft, vehicles, small arms, communications — is imported. The United States is the primary supplier; Israel has provided surveillance equipment. Brazil supplied Super Tucano light-attack aircraft. Equipment readiness is reported as poor by international assessors, with maintenance backlogs and spare-parts shortages common. The FFAA also operate civic-action and engineering programmes that substitute for civil government in rural areas — blurring military versus developmental roles and absorbing budget that might otherwise fund readiness.
Honduras faces no interstate military threats; all operational focus is internal. The state of emergency declared in December 2022 expanded militarised policing across major cities, resulting in mass arrests of alleged gang members. Human rights organisations — including COFADEH and Human Rights Watch — have documented arbitrary detentions and deaths in custody. The Castro government extradited former president Juan Orlando Hernández to the US on drug-trafficking charges in April 2022, straining civil-military relations given Hernández's deep ties to military leadership. Relations with the US remained complicated through 2025 over extradition cooperation and recognition of Taiwan.
The state of emergency was renewed multiple times through 2024-2025, cumulatively covering most of the country's major urban centres. Honduras switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 2023, with Beijing subsequently offering infrastructure investment though no significant defence procurement has followed. The US Southern Command maintained joint exercises with the FFAA through 2025. President Castro continued to navigate tension between her socialist political base — sceptical of military power — and operational dependence on the FFAA to manage gang violence.
President Castro declared a state of emergency in December 2022, suspending constitutional protections to allow warrantless searches and mass detentions of suspected gang members. It has been repeatedly renewed and expanded to cover additional municipalities, following a model similar to El Salvador's Bukele approach, though with less centralized command.
MS-13 and Barrio 18 street gangs remain primary threats, though structured Honduran trafficking organisations — including remnants of the Cachiros and Valle Valle groups — linked to Mexican cartels (Sinaloa, CJNG) also operate. Gang-driven homicide, extortion of businesses, and territorial control of marginalised urban areas are the main challenges.
Yes, though at reduced levels versus the pre-Castro era. CARSI funding and Foreign Military Financing continue. US Southern Command maintains exercises and training programmes. The relationship was strained by Honduras's Taiwan derecognition and Castro's calls to review the US military presence at Soto Cano Air Base.