Rank #95 · Middle East
Yemen remains one of the world's most fractured conflict zones, with the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) controlling Sanaa and much of north-west Yemen, and the internationally recognised Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) based in Aden. All military expenditure data for Yemen is a rough estimate across incompatible factions. The Houthis' Red Sea campaign of 2023-2025 — attacking commercial shipping and US/UK naval assets — elevated Yemen's conflict to global strategic significance far beyond its GDP.
CAUTION: Reliable budget data does not exist for Yemen. The PLC government in Aden nominally controls the central bank and some oil revenues, but the Houthis seized the Hodeidah port revenue stream as a primary funding mechanism, imposing fuel levies and customs duties estimated at $1-2 billion annually. Iran supplies the Houthis with missiles, drones, and technical assistance — an in-kind contribution not captured in any budget. Saudi Arabia and UAE fund PLC-aligned forces directly, via payroll transfers and weapons donations. Both sets of figures are opaque. Any aggregate "Yemen military spending" number is a modelling exercise, not an accountable figure.
Yemen has no unified military. Key factions: (1) Houthi/Ansar Allah forces — estimated 150,000-200,000 fighters, controlling Sanaa, Hodeidah, Hajja, Sa'ada, and most of the northern highlands; equipped with Iranian-supplied Shahed-style drones, anti-ship missiles (C-802 derivatives), and ballistic missiles. (2) PLC-aligned forces — nominally ~50,000 regular forces across fragmented commands including the National Army, Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces, and tribal militias in Marib and Hadramawt. (3) The STC itself has its own command structure and was funded primarily by the UAE. No integrated chain of command exists on the PLC side.
Yemen has no defence industry. Houthi forces have demonstrated significant capability in reverse-engineering Iranian weapons systems, modifying commercially available drones, and assembling composite missiles from imported components. The Red Sea campaign (2023-2025) used Shahed 136-type loitering munitions, anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), and subsurface drones — most derived from Iranian technology. Components are sourced via networks through Oman, East Africa, and the Gulf. PLC-aligned forces depend entirely on GCC arms transfers. The UN arms embargo on Yemen has been chronically violated by multiple parties.
Yemen's conflict has multiple active dimensions: (1) Red Sea shipping attacks — Houthis attacked over 100 vessels between November 2023 and mid-2025, triggering US-UK Operation Poseidon Archer strikes beginning January 2024 and subsequent ongoing strikes. (2) Saudi/UAE-led coalition reduced direct combat operations after a UN-brokered truce (April 2022) which has largely held for frontline ground combat. (3) Internal PLC fragmentation — STC vs National Army tensions continue in south Yemen. (4) Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS-Yemen operate in Hadramawt and other areas. The Houthi Red Sea campaign continued despite US strikes through 2025, with Iran providing replacement munitions.
US and UK Operation Poseidon Archer strikes against Houthi infrastructure have continued from January 2024 through 2025-2026, targeting missile storage, radar, and port facilities. The Houthis continued attacks on Red Sea shipping through 2025, claiming solidarity with Gaza, and expanded strikes toward the Indian Ocean. A major US carrier strike group surge in early 2025 escalated strike tempo. Several Houthi leadership figures were killed in US strikes. The PLC government, facing fiscal insolvency due to Hodeidah revenue loss, appealed to Saudi Arabia for budget support. Peace negotiations remained deadlocked as of early 2026.
Neither side controls the whole country. The Houthis (Ansar Allah) control Sanaa, Hodeidah port, and most of the densely populated north-west highlands — roughly 70-80% of the population. The Presidential Leadership Council controls Aden and most of the south and east. Marib (oil fields) is contested.
The Houthis declared their Red Sea campaign in November 2023 as solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza following the Hamas-Israel war. They targeted vessels with any connection to Israel, the US, or the UK, disrupting global shipping lanes worth ~$1 trillion in annual trade. The campaign continued despite US-UK strikes.
The US-UK military operation launched in January 2024 targeting Houthi missile and drone infrastructure in Yemen. It has involved hundreds of strikes against radar, weapons storage, port infrastructure, and launch sites. Despite sustained strikes, the Houthis continued their maritime campaign through Iranian munition resupply.
No. All figures on this page are rough estimates across incompatible factions. The Houthis publish no budget. The PLC government's finances are partially tracked by the IMF and World Bank but incomplete. Iran's in-kind military support to the Houthis is not captured in any spending figure.