Rank #55 · Middle East
Lebanon's official military spending of approximately $1.5 billion masks a profoundly dysfunctional defence environment shaped by the 2019 financial collapse, Hezbollah's parallel military structure that dwarfs the Lebanese Armed Forces in offensive capability, and the devastating 2024 Israel-Hezbollah war. The LAF survives primarily through US, French, and Gulf state aid rather than Lebanese state resources.
Lebanon's state budget has been in deep dysfunction since the 2019 financial collapse that wiped out ~90% of the Lebanese pound's value. The Lebanese Armed Forces' official budget is denominated in a currency that trades at ~89,500 LBP/USD on the parallel market, rendering nominal salary figures almost meaningless. Soldiers effectively earn $50-80/month equivalent, forcing widespread moonlighting and attrition among skilled personnel. The LAF's operational viability depends critically on external aid: US security assistance has run ~$200M/year in equipment and training, France contributes logistic support, and Gulf states — primarily Saudi Arabia — have made periodic cash donations. A 2024 French-led donor conference raised $300M in emergency LAF support in response to the post-war stabilisation requirement.
The Lebanese Armed Forces are organised into four regional military commands, with a total nominal strength of ~80,000 but effective operational capability well below that figure due to economic attrition. The Army fields ageing M60A3 and M48A5 Patton tanks, M113 APCs, and artillery including 155mm howitzers donated by the US. The small Lebanese Air Force operates UH-1H Hueys, Gazelle helicopters, and armed Cessna AC-208 Combat Caravans — functional for counter-terrorism but not peer conflict. The Lebanese Navy patrols with small patrol craft. The LAF's defining strategic limitation is that it cannot confront Hezbollah — an Iran-backed militia with ~30,000 fighters, guided rocket arsenals (100,000+), and political power — making Lebanon's de facto military balance radically different from official LAF figures.
Lebanon has no meaningful domestic defence industry. All platforms, ammunition, and sustainment parts are imported, primarily via US Foreign Military Financing grants. The country's economic collapse has eliminated the tax base needed to sustain even basic procurement. Prior to 2019, Lebanon had a small defence electronics sector and some light-arms maintenance capacity. Post-collapse, those capabilities have largely atrophied. The 2020 Beirut port explosion — which destroyed a quarter of the city and killed 218 people — further devastated what industrial infrastructure remained. Lebanon is entirely dependent on external donors for any capital military spending.
The October 2023 - November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah war was the most destructive conflict in Lebanon since 2006 and potentially since the civil war. Israeli strikes destroyed an estimated $4-8 billion in infrastructure, killed over 3,500 Lebanese (mostly civilians), and displaced up to 1.2 million people. The November 2024 ceasefire required Hezbollah withdrawal north of the Litani River and deployment of 10,000 LAF troops to south Lebanon under UNIFIL oversight — the largest LAF deployment in the south in decades. As of mid-2026, Israeli forces maintained positions in five Lebanese "strategic points" past the ceasefire deadline, and skirmishes continued at the Blue Line. Reconstruction financing and Hezbollah disarmament remain unresolved.
The November 2024 ceasefire brokered by the US and France ended 13 months of Hezbollah-Israel hostilities. Lebanon elected Joseph Aoun (then LAF Commander) as President in January 2025 — ending 26 months of presidential vacancy — and formed a government under PM Nawaf Salam in February 2025. The new government committed to implementing UN Resolution 1701 (Hezbollah disarmament south of Litani) but faces enormous practical obstacles. The 2025 Cedar Conference donor pledges totalled $7.5B for reconstruction. US security assistance to the LAF was increased to $250M for FY2025 to support south Lebanon deployment. Israeli partial withdrawal from Lebanese territory occurred in phases through early 2026 but remained incomplete.
Officially around $1.5B, but this figure is highly misleading. The Lebanese pound collapse since 2019 means the LAF budget buys a fraction of what it once did. The force's operational survival depends on ~$200-250M/year in US Foreign Military Financing and periodic Gulf/French aid packages.
Hezbollah's military wing — Radwan forces plus the broader resistance structure — fields an estimated 20,000-45,000 fighters, precision-guided missiles, drones, and a dedicated logistics network supplied by Iran. The LAF (~80,000 nominal) has superior numbers but inferior firepower, no air force to speak of, and is politically constrained from confronting Hezbollah directly.
The LAF largely stayed out of the fighting, which occurred between Israel and Hezbollah. After the November 2024 ceasefire, the LAF deployed ~10,000 troops to south Lebanon for the first time since 2006, tasked with implementing Resolution 1701. The war devastated Lebanese infrastructure and further crippled the state's already-collapsed finances.
Primarily the United States (~$200-250M/year in FMF equipment and training), France (equipment donations and training), and periodic Gulf state cash transfers — notably from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Lebanon's own state revenue covers personnel salaries in depreciated local currency but little meaningful capital investment.